d19a3ca557
AppAvatar::init() create_dir_all failure now logs a warning instead of failing fatally. This fixes the email worker crash — it runs AppService but has no PVC mount, so /data/avatars is not accessible. Other services (app) have the PVC mounted and are unaffected.
97 lines
3.4 KiB
Rust
97 lines
3.4 KiB
Rust
use config::AppConfig;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct AppAvatar {
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pub basic_path: PathBuf,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
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pub struct AvatarLoad {
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w: Option<u32>,
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h: Option<u32>,
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}
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impl AppAvatar {
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pub async fn init(cfg: &AppConfig) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
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let path = cfg.avatar_path()?;
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if std::fs::read_dir(&path).is_err() {
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if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(&path) {
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tracing::warn!(path = %path, error = %e, "Avatar directory not available, avatars disabled");
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}
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}
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let basic_path = PathBuf::from(path);
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Ok(Self { basic_path })
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}
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pub async fn upload(&self, file: Vec<u8>, file_name: String, ext: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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// Validate file size (max 5MB)
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if file.len() > 5 * 1024 * 1024 {
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anyhow::bail!("File size exceeds 5MB limit");
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}
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// Validate extension
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let allowed_exts = ["png", "jpg", "jpeg", "gif", "webp"];
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if !allowed_exts.contains(&ext) {
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid file extension: {}", ext);
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}
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// Sanitize filename to prevent path traversal
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let sanitized_name = file_name.replace(['/', '\\', '.', ':'], "_");
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if sanitized_name.is_empty() || sanitized_name.len() > 255 {
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid filename");
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}
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let image = image::load_from_memory(&*file)?;
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image.save(self.basic_path.join(format!("{}.{}", sanitized_name, ext)))?;
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Ok(())
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}
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pub async fn load(&self, file_name: String, load: AvatarLoad) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
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// Sanitize filename to prevent path traversal
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let sanitized_name = file_name.replace(['/', '\\', '.', ':'], "_");
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if sanitized_name.is_empty() || sanitized_name.len() > 255 {
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid filename");
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}
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let path = self.basic_path.join(format!("{}.png", sanitized_name));
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// Verify path is within basic_path
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let canonical_path = path.canonicalize().unwrap_or(path.clone());
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if !canonical_path.starts_with(&self.basic_path) {
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anyhow::bail!("Path traversal detected");
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}
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let image = image::open(canonical_path)?;
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let (w, h) = (
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load.w.unwrap_or(image.width()),
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load.h.unwrap_or(image.height()),
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);
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let image = image.resize(w, h, image::imageops::FilterType::Nearest);
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Ok(image.as_bytes().to_vec())
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}
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pub async fn delete(&self, file_name: String, ext: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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// Validate extension
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let allowed_exts = ["png", "jpg", "jpeg", "gif", "webp"];
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if !allowed_exts.contains(&ext) {
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid file extension: {}", ext);
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}
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// Sanitize filename to prevent path traversal
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let sanitized_name = file_name.replace(['/', '\\', '.', ':'], "_");
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if sanitized_name.is_empty() || sanitized_name.len() > 255 {
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid filename");
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}
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let path = self.basic_path.join(format!("{}.{}", sanitized_name, ext));
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// Verify path is within basic_path
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let canonical_path = path.canonicalize().unwrap_or(path.clone());
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if !canonical_path.starts_with(&self.basic_path) {
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anyhow::bail!("Path traversal detected");
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}
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std::fs::remove_file(canonical_path)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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